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Abstract
This paper considers conceptual mismatches between the theories of 
multicultural education and multicultural political philosophy. Will 
Kymlicka (2003) has argued that the levels of educational and political 
implementation might not be unequivocally compatible. From 
educational perspective, however, it is essential that the state’s chosen 
multicultural policy model reflects the educational reality of schools. 
At the same time, it is crucial to consider what kind of multicultural 
ideals the school upholds and promotes. I suggest that philosopher 
Anne Phillips’ (2007) notion of “multiculturalism without culture” 
could provide a conceptual way to overcome the discontinuities 
between education and politics.
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Introduction
All liberal, democratic societies are committed to implementing multicultural 
policies through their commitment to international human rights covenants and 
to multicultural ideals. These societies have a commitment to provide asylum 
for refugees, to offer fair conditions of integration for various cultural groups, 
to respect minority religions, to compensate for present disadvantages of various 
social groups, to remedy historical injustices committed towards various cultural 
groups and to prevent cultural bias, prejudice and racism. Even if the school had 
previously been one of the main instruments of assimilation in all the societies 
we now call democratic and liberal, nowadays education is often considered to be 
one of the most important tools to combat prejudice, racism and social inequality 
as well as a central tool to advance social integration and ascent. Furthermore, 
the formal, mandatory basic (school) education is often seen as one of the main 
arenas for children and young people to socialise with students from different 
cultural backgrounds and thus to learn social skills to manage their lives and 
thrive in socially and culturally diverse societies. At the same time, the school 
is also one of the central arenas of multicultural disputes. On a national policy 
level, decisions must be made on which subjects, topics and languages should be 
taught at schools, if religious subjects and symbols should be allowed within state-
conducted basic education and how strong an influence parents should have on 
their children’s education. At the practical level, schools must make decisions on 
how they respond to problems such as racism, gender-based prejudices and various 
social inequalities in every day school life. However, political philosophy has paid 
surprisingly little attention to children and their education, despite that fact that 
the issues of children’s education have a wider societal and political background 
and that children’s formal education is an integral institution in any society, a part 
of society’s basic structure. Furthermore, as a branch of political philosophy, the 
theory of liberal multiculturalism has focused mainly on contemplating the just 
relations between the state and its (adult) citizens.
By contrast, educational theories have long been involved in questions 
concerning diversity and equality at schools. Pedagogies aimed at managing 
diversity and levelling down societal inequalities tied to individuals’ cultural, 
social, economic, physical, personal, etc. differences have often been developed 
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under the name of ‘multicultural education’. However, educational theories on 
social diversity and multiculturalism have developed without much connection 
to theories of multiculturalism in political philosophy. Rob Reich has noted that 
while multicultural educational theory and multicultural liberal philosophy 
discuss the same issues, these two branches of theory have developed curiously 
unaware of each other (Reich, 2002, p. 175). This lack of connection is potentially 
problematic for both theories. In consequence of this misconnection, and 
because these theories focus mainly on adults, political theories often lack a 
comprehensive picture of the educational reality of children and young people. 
Adult-focused political theories are not straightforwardly applicable to children 
and their education because children differ from adults in the sense that children 
are considered not yet fully rational and informed beings. Children are dependent 
on adults in many ways and are thus also vulnerable to adult decision making 
(Brighouse, 2002). Still, because the future success of any political community 
depends on the education of future generations, political theories should be 
able to give at least some guidance on why and how political ideals should be 
implemented in children’s education (Levinson, 1999). 
At the same time, educational practices should follow the most justified moral 
and political ideals. If there is no communication between political and educational 
theories, it might be impossible to trace political implications and consequences 
of educational practices. For instance, a fully individualistic educational approach 
to multiculturalism – an approach that focuses solely on improving individuals’ 
skills and dispositions, such as language skills or interpersonal skills – conforms to 
neoliberal views on education. Neoliberal ideologies of education are uninterested 
in topics of social justice and emphasise the abilities of an individual to compete 
with others in education and the job market. Intercultural skill can be seen as 
individuals’ assets in competition for jobs and positions, especially in times of 
the free movement of capital and the workforce. Neoliberal educators welcome 
enhancing individuals’ capacities – as long as the underlying moral and political 
assumptions of the market-driven educational approach are left intact. Even the 
more social justice-oriented educational approaches can lead us astray, if their 
background assumptions are not questioned. For instance, a purely identity-based 
focus on cultural and social recognition might conceal those material inequalities 
which often go hand-in-hand with social and cultural marginalisation (Kymlicka, 
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2004, pp. xiv–xv, see also Benhabib, 2002, p. 68). Similarly, educational 
approaches based on unproblematised group identities can exaggerate or even 
create differences between sociocultural and religious groups from a young age. 
Pedagogical practices based on a naïve understanding of ‘culture’ can at worst lead 
to ethno-cultural stereotyping, treating individuals mainly as representatives of 
‘their’ cultural or social group (Reich, 2002, pp. 132, 177–178, 181).
To avoid the unintentional promotion of unjustified political ideas, it is crucial 
that educational and political theories inform each other. Interaction between 
two branches of theory does not require unifying terms and perspectives, but the 
theories should be able to communicate. The most basic condition for theoretical 
interaction is that the different approaches understand each other’s main terms 
and concepts. In this paper, I first proceed to question the notion of ‘culture’ in 
both educational and political theories. One central observation is that social 
diversity at schools seems to entail the recognition of a wider repertoire of groups 
than what is traditionally recognised by philosophers of liberal multiculturalism. 
Thus, political philosophy should take the educational context into account 
more so if its aim is to provide a sounder theory and more relevant suggestions 
for educational practice. Second, I study the terminological mismatches between 
educational theory and political philosophy in general. I conclude that some of the 
terminological disparities are due to differences in perspectives. However, I also 
claim that practical implementations of multicultural ideals would benefit from 
wider interaction between these two theory branches. Last, I suggest that both 
educational theory and political theory would benefit from a more agent-centred 
perspective on culture and consider Anne Phillips’s conception of multiculturalism 
without ‘culture’ as one option for conceptually bridging educational and political 
theories of multiculturalism.
The many faces of multiculturalism and the value of ‘culture’
To start with, it is important to separate between the descriptive and normative 
usage of the term ‘multicultural’. As a description, ‘multicultural’ simply 
characterises any modern society which is diverse by nature. However, there are 
various normative responses to social and cultural diversity. States that implement 
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multicultural policies accept a couple of fundamental ideals: that a state is never 
composed of one nation only and that there is no need for assimilation or a 
requirement to hide one’s ethno-cultural background (Kymlicka, 2003, p. 150). At 
the minimum, a normative, value-based response to social pluralism entails that no 
active measures are considered necessary to reduce social diversity and pluralism: 
the state does not necessarily need to encourage integration but does not need 
to compensate for any disadvantages caused by minority status, either. A way of 
executing this kind of minimal response to social diversity would include granting 
social and cultural groups ‘the right to be left alone’. This means that, on the basis 
of respecting (adult) individuals’ freedoms of conscience and association, those 
social or cultural groups that so wish to would be given the right to live without 
interference from other sociocultural groups or from the state (Kukathas, 1992, 
p. 122). However, individuals or groups would not be encouraged or supported to 
uphold their own culture or customs, either financially or otherwise. Concerning 
education, Chandran Kukathas suggests that many such groups, such as the Roma 
in Europe, should be allowed to educate their own children according to their 
own customs, without being obliged to send their children to schools or any other 
kind of state-conducted education (Kukathas, 1992, pp. 117, 126–127). 
In contrast, according to ‘maximal’ normative responses to cultural diversity, 
active measures to maintain or encourage diversity are considered necessary. 
The range of the active measures employed vary: they can include granting state 
funding for religious or linguistic groups or even imposing restrictions on group 
members. For instance, a linguistic group could be compelled to educate their 
children in a minority language; such is partially the case of the French-speaking 
minority in Quebec, Canada. This maximal response is sometimes called ‘strong 
multiculturalism’, and it is often based on the normative idea of cultures as 
internally valuable and mutually exclusive. Curiously, many nationalistic political 
currents seem to be based on a similar ‘multiculturalist’ rationale on the ontology 
and value of culture – which, according to the nationalist perspective, could then 
be cherished and contained within the borders of a nation-state.
‘Multicultural policy’ refers to the common rules various cultural and social 
groups are to live by within a society. In practice, there are various multicultural 
policy models, many of which have been created according to purely pragmatic 
and not by any normative reasons. For instance, a model such as the ‘German 
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model’ was ‘created’ when foreign citizens were inducted into the country 
as a temporary workforce for purely economic reasons, whereas the ‘British 
model’ has its roots in the days of the British Commonwealth. In Germany, the 
predominantly Turkish foreign workforce was considered to be temporary, the 
state neither considered their social integration to be important nor offered many 
opportunities for integration. During the last few decades, this policy model has 
led to the creation of somewhat isolated migrant subcultures. In Britain, when 
conflicts occurred between various migrant groups during the 1980s, the chosen 
state-level solution was to establish and finance these groups’ ‘own’ cultural events 
and centres. This policy response, which from the governmental perspective was 
administratively easy and inexpensive, has contributed further to the formation of 
separate cultural groups within the society (see Malik, 2006). 
As liberal societies are based on the moral and legal respect of basic freedoms 
of expression, conscience and religion and upholding the freedom of speech, they 
maintain normative diversity at least in the minimal sense. At the same time, 
it is evident that not every model of multiculturalism encourages liberal values. 
Multiculturalism in the strongest sense can turn against some fundamental 
liberal principles if the preservation of cultural groups means compromising 
fundamental individual freedoms and rights. For instance, religious associations 
might be granted exemption from following state laws, such as in respecting the 
right to marry. In the same manner, multiculturalism in the weakest sense can 
leave the most vulnerable groups, such as non-native majority language speakers, 
refugees and children, without adequate support for integrating and succeeding 
in society. Therefore, liberal societies should situate themselves somewhere 
between the two extremes. Liberal democratic societies usually wish to preserve 
at least some common rules which apply to all individuals in society, even if 
some communities have been granted partial self-determination rights. The most 
important principles of liberal societies are individual freedom, equality and 
justice, which are expressed in the declarations and covenants of human rights 
embedded in national legislation. One of the more important principles of liberal 
multiculturalism therefore is respecting everyone’s central human rights. 
In liberal political philosophy, cultures are considered important because of 
their significance to individuals. Theories of liberal multiculturalism understand 
the value of culture as both instrumental and individualistic: a culture’s value is 
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defined by its importance to its members. When a culture loses its significance to 
its members, it also loses its value (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 75; Margalit & Raz, 1995, p. 
87). According to liberal multicultural theory, one’s culture plays an instrumental 
part in the person’s wellbeing and quality of life. Reflective freedom to live in 
accordance with our beliefs and values is considered to be a precondition for 
leading a good life in liberal theory (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 81). An individual’s self-
respect and feelings of dignity can be strongly tied to their cultural background 
and relations. Thus, if a person’s culture is not generally respected in society, 
their feelings of self-respect and dignity can be threatened. Public vilification 
of a cultural group can cause its members to lose their self-confidence and to 
internalise the negative collective image. In contrast, a flourishing culture can offer 
its members meaningful relationships, goals and opportunities to identify with 
and even provide a sense of belonging which is not conditional on achievements or 
merit (Margalit & Raz, 1995, pp. 84–85, 87; Benhabib, 2002, p. 51). 
Education is relevant to any multicultural political model because the 
development of an individual’s reflective freedom to live by their own chosen 
values requires access to relevant information about cultural choices as well as 
actual opportunities to make those choices (Kymlicka, 1995, p. 86). However, a 
comparison between multicultural political theories and multicultural educational 
theories reveals that despite being of the same topic, these two branches of theory 
understand their central terms in a very different manner.
Conceptual mismatches I: ‘Cultural’ groups in education and political theory
Normatively, multicultural and intercultural educational approaches are based on 
the ideal of educational equality: ‘…the idea that all students – regardless of their 
gender and social class and their ethnic, racial, or cultural characteristics – should 
have an equal opportunity to learn in school’ (Banks, 2005, p. 3). Multicultural 
educational theory has been developed in response to the observed personal, socio-
economic and cultural differences between pupils and to level out educational 
inequalities which correlate strongly with these differences. Multicultural 
educational approaches are concerned with ethnocentrism in education because 
certain ethno-cultural and social perspectives in education threaten to dominate, 
bypass or undermine minority perspectives. Culturally biased education can 
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severely hinder minority individuals’ educational success by treating individuals 
according to stereotypical images – even when education is generally considered 
to be a central tool for overcoming social inequalities and providing opportunities 
for socio-economic prosperity. In addition to fighting straightforward racism, 
sexism and homophobia at school, pedagogical measures include diversifying the 
curriculum by including histories of minority groups and offering pupils options 
for learning and interacting with other children and youth with diverse (cultural) 
backgrounds (Banks, 2005, Introduction; Reich, 2002, pp. 131, 175–176). 
Similarly, philosophers of liberal multiculturalism acknowledge that an 
individual’s access to culture is not automatically guaranteed in any liberal society. 
Cultural dominance can be devastating especially for people with indigenous 
cultures who have not chosen to live as a minority and who possessed a rich 
culture of their own before the colonisation of their land. Thus, securing access 
to culture requires more than upholding individual freedom and liberty. In 
addition to freedom, active measures of cultural or communal recognition and 
accommodation are needed. These special protections can include opportunities 
to study in minority and majority languages, financial support of cultural events 
and granting certain groups partial self-determination or even the right to full 
self-governance. According to liberal multicultural theories, these active measures 
of cultural accommodation are required to guarantee an individual’s access to his 
or her own culture. Furthermore, enough education on cultural issues and values 
is needed to provide information on cultural choices and to enhance students’ 
reflective capabilities as well as to develop their virtues of tolerance and acceptance 
(Kymlicka, 1995, p. 86; 2010).
However, multicultural education and multicultural political theory perceive 
the most relevant ‘cultural’ groups very differently. Multicultural educational 
theories consider issues as varied as ethno-cultural groups, such as African-
American, Latino, First Nations or indigenous groups, student poverty, gender, 
class, ‘race’ and sexual minorities as well as ethnicity, creed, disability and talent 
(see also e.g. Banks & Banks-McGee, 2005; Reich, 2002, p. 176; Banks ‘Series 
Foreword’ in Mayo, 2014). One of the basic tenets of multicultural education has 
been that everyone has a culture according their group and that cultural differences 
must be recognised in order to avoid cultural bias in education. This means that 
teachers must first be aware of their own cultural and social background and how 
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this background and one’s often unarticulated attitudes and biases might influence 
one’s way of teaching and treating pupils and choice of educational materials and 
topics (Banks, 2005, p. 4; 2014, p. viii).
In contrast to educational theory, liberal multiculturalism focuses almost 
exclusively on groups of ethnic and indigenous origin, language and religion. 
Pioneering philosopher of liberal multiculturalism Will Kymlicka recognises in 
his theory only cultures with an institutional basis. In Kymlicka’s model, ‘culture’ 
is nearly identical to a nation or state. For instance, he describes the USA as one 
societal culture, which is dominated by the English-speaking culture (Kymlicka, 
1995, pp. 77–78). These ‘societal cultures’ in Kymlicka’s theory include national 
minorities and indigenous groups as well as immigrant groups (as originating 
from other societal cultures). In Kymlicka’s model, these groups are granted 
different rights. In his model, indigenous groups are entitled to the most extensive 
self-determination rights, whereas national minorities, such as minority language 
groups, would only be granted less extensive rights to partial self-determination 
or rights to political representation. Immigrant groups would mainly be granted 
rights to fairer terms of integration (Kymlicka, 2010). Other groups, such as ones 
based on gender variation, class, sexuality or ‘race’, Kymlicka defines not as cultural 
groups but as social movements (Kymlicka, 1995, pp. 18, 76–77). Therefore, when 
applied to education, Kymlicka’s theory clearly provides a different idea from what 
we typically consider to be multicultural education. Learning about the history 
of different nations or peoples or studying foreign languages would not usually 
be thought of as multicultural or intercultural education. Rather, learning about 
world history or learning a new language is usually considered to be an essential 
part of any liberal or general (basic) education. 
Therefore, the first problem in comparing the perspectives of multicultural 
education on one hand and liberal multiculturalism in the other is that they 
are clearly talking about different sociocultural groups. It might be that in 
multicultural educational approaches, the term ‘culture’ is used too loosely. On 
what conceptual basis can we consider gender and sexual minorities, people 
with disabilities or the gifted as ‘cultures’? If these groups are considered to be 
‘cultures’ which require recognition and accommodation, what rights should 
gender minorities or the specially gifted be entitled to as cultural groups, for 
instance? Would all these various groups be accommodated on a similar moral or 
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political basis? (compare Song, 2009). Then again, as argued above, multicultural 
education based on a rigid conception of ‘culture’ clearly does not suffice as an 
educational practice when we talk about ‘multicultural education’. Multicultural 
or intercultural education usually aims at developing virtues of tolerance and 
acceptance of wider social variety than mere ‘cultural’ diversity. 
Conceptual mismatches II: Multiculturalism and interculturalism
One central debate in regard to multiculturalism concerns the terms employed 
in the discussion. The notion of ‘multicultural’ has been widely debated in both 
political philosophy and educational theory as the term itself seems to preserve 
the idea of cultural groups as separate wholes, which are internally homogenic 
and somewhat deterministic. The term ‘multicultural’ seems to imply that there 
are separate ‘cultures’ which can exist in a society, side by side in a ‘multiple’ form, 
without extensive mutual interaction and following their own legislative rules. 
Such models of ‘mosaic’ multiculturalism can be highly problematic especially 
from the viewpoint of gender equality. For instance, in the case of separate 
jurisdictions, it is easy to privilege some groups over others, especially the rights 
of the more powerful (usually older men) over the rights of the less powerful 
(women, young people and children) (Okin, 1999; Benhabib, 2002; Phillips, 2007, 
p. 19). Similarly, educational theorists have noted the potentially problematic 
connotations of the term. What, for instance, would it mean in practice to 
educate children by ‘their own’ culture within the same school or society? On the 
contrary, one of the main aims of school, and citizenship education specifically, 
is to learn to cope and navigate within socially diverse societies. Furthermore, 
it is impossible to designate children to one cultural group only. Due to these 
theoretical and practical problems, multicultural educational approaches tend 
to emphasise the flexibility and individual nature of one’s culture (Erickson, 
2005, pp. 32–33, 40–41, 44–45). To underscore the flexibility of cultures and 
cultural belonging, educational theorists usually prefer terms such as ‘cross-’ or 
‘intercultural’ education instead of ‘multicultural’ education. However, there is 
cultural variation in the use of these terms. The term ‘multicultural education’ is 
more often used in Anglo-American contexts, whereas ‘intercultural education’ 
is more widely used in European contexts (Rodríquez-Izquierdo, 2018, pp. 612–
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613). Solely changing the main terms does not avoid the conceptual difficulties if 
the terms’ background assumptions are left unanalysed. Furthermore, conceptual 
mismatches can hinder interdisciplinary cooperation.
Despite the conceptual problems inherent in the term ‘multicultural’, 
political theorists still mainly use the term instead of ‘intercultural’. The latter 
term is only sporadically used within the field of political philosophy (see the 
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, https://plato.stanford.edu/search/searcher.
py?query=intercultural). For political philosophers, multiculturalism is first a 
normative policy model and not a theory about desirable personal attitudes and 
skills. Liberal multiculturalism takes a stance only on what would be the best 
normative and political principles of multicultural society. It does not insist on the 
citizens acquiring a disposition of cultural sensibility or any other intercultural 
skill (Kymlicka, 2010). In contrast, multicultural or intercultural education aims 
to influence the pupils’ attitudes towards diversity by teaching to accept, navigate 
with and appreciate the different cultural groups, habits, life-styles, life-choices 
and personal outlooks, both locally and globally (see Reich, 2002, p. 130; Kymlicka, 
2003). Despite the variation in the main concepts, the liberal versions of both 
multicultural political theory and multicultural educational theory usually share 
the central tenets of egalitarian liberalism. Both branches of theory believe that 
the society should aim to level inequalities tied to an individual’s personal, social 
and cultural characteristics. As the school is the main institution responsible for 
educating the future citizens of society and (at its best) one of the main institutions 
for bringing about social integration, multicultural political theorists should be 
interested in education. For the same reasons, multicultural educational theorists 
should be interested in the political background assumptions and implications 
of the practices of multicultural education. However, mutual interaction might 
be difficult if the theories continue to use different terms and notions when 
addressing the same topics.
One way to solve the mismatch between the use of the terms ‘multicultural’ 
and ‘intercultural’ would simply be to allow them to address different levels of 
multicultural analysis. Will Kymlicka has suggested that the term ‘multicultural’ 
could be reserved for the national and political level only. According to him, 
the term ‘intercultural’ should rather be used to address topics at individual or 
psychological (or educational) levels. Thus, the term multicultural would only 
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point to the questions of how to ensure the just treatment of all cultural groups 
within a pluralistic state. In contrast, the notion of ‘intercultural virtues’ would 
rather describe the qualities and virtues required of a person who is living in a 
multicultural society. At the minimum, these virtues would include accepting 
liberal multiculturalism as well as accepting that certain skills are needed in order 
to live well within a culturally and socially diverse society. The educational process 
of an intercultural citizen would thus include enhancing the development of 
positive attitudes towards liberal multiculturalism as well as some essential skills 
to cope and thrive within diverse societies (Kymlicka, 2003, pp. 147, 154). 
Understood as distinct levels of analysis, multiculturalism and interculturalism 
would, thus, simply provide different perspectives on cultural diversity. However, 
allowing this would require admitting that these perspectives necessarily stand 
in a complex and sometimes conflicting relation to each other. When one starts 
analysis from the individual level, one might end up with quite different practical 
and political suggestions than when starting analysis from the level of the state 
and proceeding towards the individual (Kymlicka, 2003, p. 148). For instance, 
upholding multicultural justice at the state level might require endorsing 
intercultural cooperation at the local level, such as in cities or municipalities. 
However, interculturally educated citizens might choose to favour global 
interculturalism instead of multiculturalism within the borders of a nation-state. 
Again, in a multicultural state, some groups may prefer to isolate themselves 
partially from the rest of the society, while in contrast, the implementation of 
intercultural ideals would demand interaction between individuals and diverse 
groups and cultures. At its worst, an ideal model of an intercultural citizen can 
encourage a tokenistic or superficial understanding of culture or emphasise an 
exaggerated view of cultural differences rather than mutual understanding. 
Kymlicka remains sceptical that these two perspectives, those of the intercultural 
citizen and of the multicultural state, could ever be fully compatible (Kymlicka, 
2003, p. 166). 
If Kymlicka is right – that interculturalism and multiculturalism represent 
two perspectives of social and cultural diversity – it also seems plausible that 
intercultural and multicultural education are not interchangeable terms. This 
is because their background assumptions and implications are different or even 
mutually exclusive. Would it then ever be possible to create a conceptual bridge 
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between political ideals and educational practice? If not, will the political 
justification of multicultural or intercultural educational aims ever be possible? In 
what follows, I claim that Kymlicka’s view on the impossibility of bridging the two 
perspectives, intercultural education and multicultural politics, is too sceptical 
and that overcoming the mismatch requires a more flexible and individualistic 
stance on ‘culture’. 
Multicultural education without ‘culture’?
Are there any ways to overcome these theoretical disparities between multicultural 
educational and political theories? In the second section I concluded that 
Kymlicka’s theory of liberal multiculturalism seems too robust for giving guidance 
on education as it does not recognise groups that are relevant to education. 
Therefore, it would be difficult to provide educational suggestions based on his 
theory. However, a combination of perspectives on education and political theory 
would be important for several central reasons. On one hand, without conceptual 
clarity, educational theories might provide misleading practical suggestions. For 
instance, if educational methods were based on untenable concepts of race, class 
and ethnicity, multi- or intercultural approaches in education could therefore 
contribute to ethno-cultural stereotyping or strengthening racial prejudices 
(Reich, 2002, pp. 132, 177–178, 181). On the other hand, it would be crucial for 
educational professionals to understand what kind of normative political models 
(which versions of multiculturalism or interculturalism) they support by their 
educational practices. Furthermore, political theories must be informed and 
aligned with educational questions before they can provide concrete guidance 
for educational practices (Reich, 2002, p. 88). When political theories lack a 
stance on education, they also lack a comprehensive perspective on society, which 
includes education as a basic institution. At the same time, political theories lack 
an understanding of their own educational presuppositions (Reich, 2002, p. 6; 
Levinson, 1999, p. 5). 
In contrast with political philosophy, educational theories aim to recognise 
a wide range of social and cultural groups at school. However, these groups are 
enormously diverse, and thus it is likely not possible to accommodate all these 
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groups on a similar moral basis (see Song, 2009). However, deliberations on 
the moral justification for accommodation would be important, especially in 
situations of scarce resources. If it is not possible to accommodate every possible 
group, on what moral basis should we choose the ones to be accommodated? There 
are also ontological questions concerning the qualifications for group membership. 
Some groups accommodated in theories of multicultural education are defined by 
referring to certain physical features or mental abilities, whereas qualifications for 
membership of other groups rely on more ‘objective’ criteria, such as individuals’ 
mother-tongue or country of origin. Furthermore, the notion of ‘culture’ is 
almost exclusively understood in connection with those who tend to ‘stand out’, 
i.e. minorities of various kinds, despite the tendency to produce culture generally 
being a profoundly human feature. In this sense the majority should be no less 
affected by ‘culture’ than minorities (Phillips, 2009, pp. 2, 5–6, 57).
However, the tendency of identifying ‘culture’ with minorities only, together 
with the deterministic viewpoint on culture, creates situations in which members 
of minority cultures are frequently characterised solely as representatives of ‘their’ 
culture. This tendency, while highly patronising, can also be truly harmful when 
it is used to undermine individual capability for agency and responsibility and 
can easily lead to two undesirable results. First, and at the gravest level, the idea 
of minority members being culturally determined has in some cases led to the 
acquittal of offenders of serious crimes such as physical abuse or even murder 
(Okin, 1999). Second, and more commonly, especially girls and young women 
are often in public discourses depicted as acting from weakness of will or ‘false 
consciousness’ when their choices seemingly do not meet the rationale of the 
majority (Phillips, 2009, p. 38). When minority membership is falsely considered 
to influence one’s rational capacities, it prevents us from appreciating all those 
decisions which many individuals are compelled to make in between the pressures 
of minority and majority cultures (Phillips, 2009, pp. 26, 46–47). In practice, the 
idea that minority girls and young women only possess partial rational capacity 
has sometimes led to restrictions being issued on minority practices, such as 
certain dress codes in public spheres. However, these ‘blanket restrictions’ do 
not differentiate between those different motivations individuals might have in 
connection to minority practices. Rather, while it should be acknowledged that 
the individual’s background culture as well as their physical appearance, sex, 
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gender, socio-economic status, etc. do shape perspectives and choices, it must 
also be granted that those personal features do not determine one’s viewpoints, 
abilities or life prospects (Phillips, 2007, p. 127).
Instead of depicting cultures as deterministic wholes, it should be acknowledged 
that individuals, even members of the same cultural group, give different meanings 
to ‘their’ culture. For instance, while some members of a culture might consider 
their way of living as a good way amongst many others, some might consider a 
particular way of living as simply the best one. Most of us probably do not actively 
think about our culturally influenced habits or customs until we are somehow 
compelled to think about them – for instance when encountering habits which 
differ from our own. For some, religion is more important than culture, and in 
some people’s lives, politics rather than culture plays a significant part (Phillips, 
2007, p. 52). Phillips stresses that we should be able to understand cultural pressures 
without assuming that culture dictates. A better understanding of choices made 
by individuals would entail bearing in mind the different perspectives and values 
concerning culture: ‘In many cases, the issue will be how to differentiate choice 
from coercion. This has to be approached differently once we drop the misguided 
understandings of culture’ (Phillips, 2009, p. 38).
Phillips suggests that instead of pinpointing certain criteria for group 
membership, the notion of ‘culture’ should be understood as being analogous to 
the concepts of ‘gender’ or ‘class’. This means that even we abandoned essentialist, 
objectivistic or deterministic definitions of culture, we would not need to 
abandon the notion altogether. Rather, Phillips calls for a more agent-centred 
and individualistic understanding of culture. An individualistic stance on culture 
would better appreciate the rationale behind one’s choices and would not depict 
people as culturally determined. This individualistic perspective would appreciate 
the individual variety in one’s ‘culture’ as well as conceptually allow social and 
cultural identities to overlap. 
Educationally, what would it mean to embrace Phillips’s notion of 
multiculturalism without ‘culture’? First, it would question the usefulness of any 
‘blanket’ restrictions on cultural habits within educational spheres or any other 
solutions to multicultural disputes which rely more on stereotypical images of 
minority groups than on adequate deliberations. Second, emphasising the idea of 
multiculturalism without culture would question those educational approaches 
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aimed at recognising groups rather than individuals. Rather than considering the 
needs of specific groups, educational approaches should be developed to better 
meet the needs of the individuals. Cultural features would still be considered to be 
important, not as group characteristics but rather as individual qualities. However, 
the dissolution of ‘culture’ might not solve the tension between intercultural 
educational approaches and multicultural policies. Because of its individualistic 
stance, multiculturalism without ‘culture’ would be more compatible with 
intercultural educational approaches. However, the potential tensions between 
individualistic intercultural education and group-based multicultural policies 
are not necessarily undesirable. Rather, providing they are morally and politically 
justified, intercultural and multicultural educational approaches might also help 
to challenge untenable multicultural policy models.   
Conclusions
When one compares theories on multicultural education and multicultural 
political philosophy, it soon becomes evident that these two theoretical branches 
understand social diversity and ‘multiculturalism’ very differently. In this paper, 
I observed two main mismatches between theories of liberal multicultural 
philosophy and multicultural education. First, it seems that liberal multicultural 
political theory presents a more restricted definition of cultural groups than 
the theory of multicultural education. At the same time, political theory does 
not seem to recognise the actual diversity in schools. This diversity includes 
a significantly wider variety of social groups than what is theorised in political 
theories. Second, multicultural educational theory and multicultural political 
theory seem to employ different sets of terminology when addressing the same 
social and cultural phenomena. For instance, while liberal multiculturalists 
prefer to address diverse societies as ‘multicultural’, educational theorist prefer 
the term ‘intercultural’. I claim that these disparities in the central conceptions 
and terms can lead to problematic misapprehensions if the political concept of 
multiculturalism is straightforwardly applied to public educational contexts or 
if the practices of multicultural education are not placed under critical political 
scrutiny. Both theories would benefit from more substantial mutual interaction. 
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If the aim of school education is to remedy or overcome societal inequalities, 
both educational and political theory would benefit from at least some kind of 
theoretical continuum between the theories. Otherwise, educational and political 
theories seem to operate in a quite different kind of multicultural society and 
arrive at dissimilar remedies for social injustices. To overcome these disparities, I 
suggest that both educational and political theories employ a more agent-centred 
conception of culture. I propose that Anne Phillips’s theory of ‘multiculturalism 
without culture’ might assist in conceptually bridging political and educational 
theories. Phillips’s theory emphasises the fact that different individuals accord a 
different kind of moral weight to ‘their’ culture. Individuals also employ varying 
strategies when navigating between the pressures of majority and minority culture. 
A more nuanced and agent-centred conception of culture appreciates these 
individual choices and aims to understand the rationale behind them. Embracing 
this more individualistic notion of culture in liberal multicultural theory would 
help to include more diversity in the theorising of multicultural society. Moreover, 
wider interaction between liberal multicultural philosophy and educational 
theory would help in selecting the most morally justified educational and policy 
responses to social and cultural diversity.
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